This paper shows that, in the presence of transaction costs payable by borrowers on renancing, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which borrowers with di ering mobility select xed rate mortgages FRMs with di erent combinations of coupon rate and points. We also show that, in the absence of such costs, no such equilibrium is possible. This provides a possible explanation for the large menus of FRMs typically encountered by potential borrowers, and suggests that the menu a v ailable at the time of origination should be an important predictor of future prepayment. We n umerically implement the model, developing the rst contingent claims mortgage valuation algorithm that can quantify the e ect of self-selection on real contracts in a realistic interest rate setting. Our algorithm allows investors to account for self-selection when valuing mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. It also, for the rst time, allows lenders to determine the optimal points coupon rate schedule to o er to a speci ed set of potential borrowers, given the current level of interest rates.
One of the most striking features of the U.S. mortgage market is the wide variety o f loans available to potential borrowers. Not only are there di erent t ypes of loan e.g. xed vs. adjustable rate, but even within any single type there are loans with many di erent combinations of interest rate and points. As an illustration of the extent of the selection available, Table 1 shows a sample of xed rate mortgages FRMs available on February 13, 1996 from a single representative U.S. mortgage lender. Furthermore, recent empirical ndings show that, for a given coupon rate, mortgages with low points tend to be prepaid more rapidly than mortgages with high points see Brueckner 1994, and Hayre and Rajan 1995 , suggesting that di erences among the behavioral characteristics of borrowers may be associated with the interest rate points trade-o . The empirical evidence in favor of this relationship is so strong that many of the new-generation prepayment models on Wall Street have been redesigned to account for the e ect of origination points on the speed of prepayment see, for example, Hayre and Rajan 1995 . Several explanations have been proposed for the existence of points. Dunn and McConnell 1981b suggest that points serve t o p a y for the prepayment option embedded in xed rate mortgages, although they do not explain why this payment should be made in the form of points, rather than via a higher coupon rate. Moreover, this story does not explain why we should see large menus of loans with di erent combinations of rates and points. Kau and Keenan 1987 suggest tax reasons for the existence of points, and one could imagine an extension of their story, in which diverse tax situations lead to a menu of di erent point rate combinations. However, if this were the explanation, we should expect the relationship between points and mobility to be the opposite of what is observed, since high tax rate individuals, who have the greatest desire to deduct points up front, also tend to be the most mobile see, for example, Borjas et al. 1992 . Moreover, despite the signi cant di erence in the tax treatment of points on a rst loan versus a re nance, 1 we see no di erence between the sets of contracts o ered to new borrowers versus re nancers. Finally, if taxes were the explanation, we should have seen a narrowing in the range of points coupon choices available when the range of possible marginal tax brackets narrowed after 1986. In fact, the reverse has happened. Another possible explanation is liquidity di erences among borrowers. Again, however, it is hard to reconcile this story with the observed relationship between points and prepayment. The people with higher liquidity, who take out loans with higher points, will nd it, on average, easier to re nance subsequently, and are relatively mobile again, see Borjas et al. 1992 . As a result, we should expect a positive relationship between points and re nancing, the opposite of what is observed.
A mobility-based explanation for the existence of points was rst informally proposed by Dunn and Spatt 1988 . They suggest that borrowers who plan to move soon ought to take out loans with a high periodic interest rate and low points, whereas those who plan not to prepay except possibly for interest rate related reasons should take out loans with higher points and a lower periodic interest rate. The choice of contract thus serves as a self-selection device see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 , allowing the lender to learn private information about potential borrowers' mobility. Not only is this intuition attractive, but it also agrees with the informal rule for mortgage choice advocated by most mortgage lenders, and with the recent empirical ndings discussed above.
The rst formal model to exhibit separation by mobility w as that of Chari and Jagannathan 1989 , in which t w o borrowers, with di erent expected times until they next move, choose di erent loans. In this model, however counter to empirical realism, it is the borrowers who expect to move sooner who choose the loan with high points and a low interest rate. 2 Brueckner 1994 develops a model in which borrowers self-select into di erent loans, with longer term borrowers selecting loans with higher points and a lower coupon, as observed in practice. However, like Chari and Jagannathan 1989, he assumes constant interest rates, which prevents his model from being able to address the issue of voluntary, interest rate driven prepayment, an important feature of any xed rate mortgage. LeRoy 1996 considers a world in which i n terest rates can take on one of two possible values, and allows borrowers to choose from a selection of in nitely lived, interest only, xed rate mortgages. However, he nds that, when borrowers re nance optimally if interest rates fall, the points coupon choice can at best serve only to separate the least mobile borrower type from all others. In his semi-pooling equilibrium, a all but the least mobile borrowers choose the same loan; and b all but the least mobile borrowers choose loans which they optimally re nance immediately. 3 Finally, Y ang 1992 constructs a loan schedule which induces selfselection by m ultiple classes of borrower, but he allows the non-competitive lender to make arbitrarily large pro ts. 4 The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it constructs an equilibrium model of mortgage choice in which transaction costs play a critical role in determining the nature 2 In this model, some individuals face an uninsurable risk of moving, and their expected income, conditional on moving, is higher than if they do not move. If they take out a loan with points and a below market interest rate, their average payment is high if they move and lower if they do not move. The contract thus provides partial insurance against moving and its associated income shock.
3 LeRoy i n terprets these loans as being adjustable rate mortgages ARMs. However, in his model, borrowers re nance their mortgages before even making their rst payment. Thus they e ectively do not borrow at all, and the market breaks down. 4 Indeed, he claims that it is impossible to construct a separating equilibrium.
of the equilibrium combinations of coupon rates and loan points faced by borrowers. 5 We show that the failure of Yang 1992 and LeRoy 1996 to construct a stable 6 separating equilibrium is not due to any speci c details of their implementation, but follows, rather, from the optimal prepayment assumption, combined with the fact that, in their models, all payments made by borrowers are received by lenders. Retaining the optimal re nancing assumption, but introducing transaction costs payable by borrowers, and not received by lenders such as appraisal fees, credit reports etc., we show that it now becomes possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which, as we observe in real life, a di erent borrowers select di erent xed rate loans with di erent combinations of coupon rate and points; and b no borrower nds it optimal to prepay his or her loan immediately. There is thus a crucial distinction between points which are a transfer from borrowers to lenders and true transaction costs which are paid to a third party. Second, we contribute to the broader literature on mortgage valuation and prepayment see, for example, Stanton 1995 , by n umerically implementing our model. We develop the rst contingent claims mortgage valuation algorithm that can quantify the e ect of selfselection on real contracts in a realistic interest rate setting. Our algorithm allows investors to account for self-selection when valuing mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Moreover, it is an equilibrium model, unlike the reduced form models used on Wall Street. It therefore, for the rst time, allows lenders to determine the optimal points coupon schedule to o er a speci ed set of potential borrowers, given the current level of interest rates.
The valuation algorithm we develop is of interest in its own right. Most recent contingent claims models which attempt to take i n to account the e ect of re nancing costs on mortgage value and optimal prepayment behavior, make the simplifying assumption that these costs are paid only on the rst re nance see, for example, Timmis 1985 and Stanton 1995 . This simplifying assumption means that a borrower's re nancing decision at any time depends only on the current loan, since no matter which loan is re nanced into, its initial value will be par. Our algorithm, like that proposed by Dunn and Spatt 1986 of which ours is an extension, allows for re nancing costs to be paid on each re nancing. The optimal re nancing rule now depends not only on the loan being re nanced out of, but also on the value of the loans available should the borrower re nance. The algorithm therefore has to calculate, simultaneously, the value and optimal re nancing strategy for loans with all coupon rates, as well as the optimal set of contracts for lenders to o er for every possible interest rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the model, describing lender and borrower objectives, and shows that, in the presence of transaction costs, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which lenders o er xed rate loans di ering only in their combinations of points and coupon. It also shows that, in the absence of such costs, it is impossible to construct such an equilibrium. Section 2 develops an algorithm which numerically implements the equilibrium, and presents results for several di erent sets of initial conditions. Section 3 presents some concluding remarks.
The Model
In the model to be presented here, di erent classes of borrower, di ering only in how long they expect to remain in their current home, select loans from a menu of self-amortizing, 30 year, xed rate mortgages o ered by lenders. 7 The loans on this menu di er only in their combination of points and coupon rate. Competitive lenders, in turn, make zero expected pro t on each loan that is taken out, and have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium menu of loans. Borrowers prepay their loans either in order to move, or because interest rates have fallen and it is optimal to re nance.
Borrowers and Prepayment
We assume that all borrowers are outwardly identical, and di er only in their mobility, measured by a borrower-speci c hazard rate . 8 The higher the value of , the sooner the borrower is likely to move. We assume that there exists a due-on-sale clause so that, on moving at time t before the loan's maturity, the borrower must re nance the outstanding balance on the mortgage, Fc; t, where c is the coupon rate on the loan. In addition to moving, borrowers may also decide to re nance their mortgages if interest rates have fallen su ciently since the loan was taken out. Write V L c; r; t ;L for lender" for the market value ignoring any points paid of a loan with time t to maturity, and coupon rate c, with monthly payments such that Fc; 30 years = $1, held by a borrower of type , if the current interest rate is r. W rite V B c; r; t B for borrower" for the market value of the associated synthetic security", also with time t to maturity, whose cash ows are equal to the payments made each month by the borrower. 9 We assume borrowers act to minimize V B in two w a ys. First, they select the best loan from the set of available contracts, subject to a maximum possible level of points, p max . 10 Second, having taken out a particular loan, they follow the optimal prepayment strategy for that loan. On re nancing, either to move or because interest rates have fallen, borrowers take out a new mortgage for the amount of the remaining principal, Fc; t. In addition, they face a proportional transaction cost, X, which i s not received by the lender. This cost represents the direct monetary costs of re nancing appraisal fees, title search etc., as well as non-monetary costs representing, for example, the inconvenience and time involved in the re nancing process. If the borrower re nances at time t, the value of the borrower's future stream of payments is thus which is less than the value of the borrower's payments because the lender does not receive the transaction costs.
We emphasize that our model is not a full general equilibrium speci cation of mortgage contract structure. In particular, we v alue the mortgage contracts, and determine the optimal re nancing strategy of borrowers, assuming they value their loans as if they are redundant. 11 9 It is necessary to distinguish between V L c; r; t and V B c; r; t , since borrowers pay transaction costs on re nancing which are not received by lenders. Since the cash ows paid out by borrowers exceed those received by lenders, V L c; r; t V B c; r; t see, for example, Dunn and Spatt 1986 . 10 Note that the construction of the separating equilibrium does not require the existence of such a p max . This value, motivated by liquidity considerations outside the model, does not change the qualitative features of the equilibrium see Section 2 . It merely allows us to calibrate the model, ensuring that the points paid by borrowers in the model are close to those we see in the market.
11 In other words, taken literally, they can frictionlessly trade in marketed securities that replicate their
In making this simpli cation, we are following one of the standard approaches used in much o f the recent academic literature on mortgage prepayment and pricing, including among many others Dunn and McConnell 1981a ,b, Dunn and Spatt 1986 , Brennan and Schwartz 1985 and Stanton 1995 . Its major advantage is that it allows us to use the well-developed theory of contingent claims valuation to calculate explicit numerical values for realistic loans under an arbitrarily complex realistic interest rate model, determine borrowers' optimal re nancing strategies, and in the present case determine the optimal menu of loans to be o ered in di erent i n terest rate environments. 12
Lenders, Adverse Selection and Equilibrium
Assume that lenders operate in a competitive market, with costless entry and exit. Lenders may know the distribution of borrowers' types, but cannot observe the ty p e o f a n y individual borrower. This leads to a potential adverse selection problem for lenders, 13 since the borrower's mobility has a signi cant impact on the value of the cash ows received by the lender. Lenders thus have an incentive to discover borrowers' types. In an attempt to discover borrowers' types, lenders may o er a menu of prepayable, 30-year xed rate loan contracts, di ering in their tradeo between points and coupon rate.
De ne L I R + to be the set of all possible borrower types. Write a mortgage menu as the set of ordered pairs fc ; p : 2 L g . This menu de nes an equilibrium at current interest rate r, i f 1. Zero pro t For all 2 L , E h V L l c ; r ; t i =F c ; t 1 , p , where the expectation is taken over all mortgage holders with type l satisfying c l = c and p l = p . In other words, the total value of the payments received by the lender loan payments plus points equals the face value of the loan. 14 mortgage cash ows. We therefore cannot, for example, explain why they borrow money using mortgage contracts with substantial re nancing costs. 12 An alternative approach, followed in several previous models of mortgage choice, is to assume that lenders are risk-neutral, while borrowers are risk-averse see, for example, Brueckner 1994 and Chari and Jagannathan 1989 . This approach recognizes that borrowers and lenders face di erent constraints, and is very useful in deriving qualitative i n tuition for the impact of these di erences. However, it is still only an approximation, since it does not attempt to solve borrowers' full optimal intertemporal consumption and investment problem, which w ould be necessary to derive the full relationship between the borrower's state dependent marginal utility of consumption and the likelihood of moving. Moreover, these models assume constant i n terest rates, preventing their being able to address the issue of interest-driven prepayment. This approach has thus not typically been used when the focus is on obtaining numerical results, rather than qualitative i n tuition.
13 See Dunn and Spatt 1988 for a good discussion of asymmetric information in mortgage markets. 14 Zero pro t on average across all loans is not su cient, since entry would occur only in the pro i.e. each borrower chooses the optimal loan for his or her type.
The equilibrium is fully separating if, whenever l 1 ; l 2 2 L and l 1 6 = l 2 , w e h a v e both c l 1 6 = c l 2 and p l 1 6 = p l 2 .
We present here two preliminary results which will be important later.
Lemma 1 For a given coupon rate, c, the value of the borrower's cash ows, V B c; r; t , i s an increasing function of . It is strictly increasing in as long as it is currently optimal not to re nance the loan.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that higher values of imply higher mobility, leading to increased prepayment when it would not otherwise be optimal. This in turn increases the likelihood that the borrower will have t o p a y the transaction costs associated with re nancing.
Lemma 2 In the presence o f t r ansaction costs, and if it is not currently optimal for the borrower to re nance, the di erence h V B c; r; t ,V L c; r; t i =Fc; t is positive, and strictly increasing in c.
Proof: This result follows from Dunn and Spatt 1986, property 8 .
The intuition behind this result is that a higher coupon rate implies a greater likelihood of future re nancing being optimal, and hence a greater likelihood that the borrower will have t o p a y the transaction costs associated with re nancing. Now consider Figure 1 . The solid line is the lender's zero-pro t line for a particular borrower type, the set of p; c pairs that satisfy the equation for a particular interest rate, r, V L c; r; t =Fc; t = 1 , p; i.e. c; r; t F c; t ; 7 for some constant K. A k ey property of this gure an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is that the indi erence curves are less steep than the zero-pro t line. Intuitively, as the coupon rate on the loan increases, the likelihood of future interest rate driven re nancing increases, thus increasing the present v alue of future re nancing costs paid by borrowers, and increasing the di erence between the value of the loan to the borrower and the value to the lender. This means that to be indi erent b e t w e e n a l o w coupon loan and a high coupon loan, the borrower will insist on lower points for the high coupon loan than the lender.
Proposition 1 In the absence of asymmetric information, but in the presence o f r e nancing costs, with competition between lenders, all borrowers will choose loans with the maximum possible points, p max .
In equilibrium, the value of a new borrower's liability equals the face value of the loan plus the present v alue of all future re nancing related transaction costs. Thus, minimizing the value of the liability is equivalent to minimizing the present v alue of these transaction costs. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that the lower the coupon rate, the less likely the borrower is to want to re nance in the future, and hence the lower the present v alue of the transaction costs see Lemma 2. The re nancing costs are thus minimized b y taking out a loan with the highest points possible which, in turn, leads to the lowest possible coupon rate.
De ne two borrower types h and l, with borrower-speci c hazards such that h l . W e shall here make one additional assumption, which is needed only to prove Proposition 2, and has no bearing on any of our other results.
A1: The di erence
h V B h c; r; t ,V B l c; r; t i =Fc; t is strictly decreasing in the coupon rate, c.
Note that the truth or otherwise of this assumption depends on the particular state of the world and interest rate speci cation we are using. This is because increasing the coupon rate has two di erent, and opposing, e ects:
1. As the coupon rate increases, it becomes optimal to re nance at higher and higher interest rates see, for example, Dunn and Spatt 1986, property 3 , reducing the number of possible states of the world in which the high mobility borrower might re nance when it is not optimal to do so due to moving. This works in the direction of A1.
2. As the coupon rate increases, the remaining balance on the loan should a borrower re nance in the future also increases, due to the change in the amortization schedule. This increases the transaction costs paid, working against A1.
Although factor 1 will often dominate factor 2, in which case A1 will be true, it is possible even within a single model for A1 to be true for some coupon rates, and false for others. For example, consider a world in which i n terest rates can take on only a discrete number of values. If the coupon rate is such that any increase makes re nancing optimal at some new interest rate, say r j , b y making the increase small enough we can make factor 1 dominate factor 2, and the di erence will indeed be decreasing in the coupon rate. On the other hand, there will be other coupon rates where we can increase the coupon by a discrete amount without making any c hange to the optimal re nancing strategy of either borrower. At such coupon rates, factor 2 will dominate factor 1, and the di erence will therefore be increasing in the coupon rate.
Proposition 2 Given assumption A1, then in the presence of asymmetric information, with or without re nancing costs, no pooling equilibrium where a l l b orrowers choose the same contract can exist.
Proof: See Appendix for a proof of this result a standard screening result -see, for example, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 . Proposition 3 In the presence of asymmetric information, but with no re nancing costs, no stable separating equilibrium can exist.
This result explains the failure of Yang 1992 and LeRoy 1996 to construct a stable separating equilibrium. It is in stark contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 , and is driven by the fact that, in the absence of transaction costs, borrowers and lenders both assign the same value to the same set of cash ows. To prove this proposition, suppose such an equilibrium did exist, and suppose borrowers h and l with h l select loans p h ; c h and p l ; c l , which they do not optimally choose to re nance immediately. so borrower l prefers the loan that is supposed to be taken out by borrower h, contradicting the incentive compatibility equilibrium condition. To prove our main result, which emphasizes the importance of including re nancing costs in the analysis, we need one further assumption. Let h and l be as above, with h l .
A2: V L h c l ; r ; t V L l c l ; r ; t , where c l is the coupon rate on the loan taken out in equilibrium by borrower l which does not depend on borrower h. Note that this assumption is exactly the same as Lemma 1, except that it relates to the lender's valuation, rather than the borrowers'. When transaction costs are zero, V B V L , so from Lemma 1, A2 must be true with zero transaction costs. More generally, A2 will be true for some range of transaction costs around zero. Moreover, it will also hold for any interest rate and any level of transaction costs, as long as we allow l o w enough coupon rates. To see this, consider a loan with zero coupon rate. With a zero coupon rate, the scheduled payment is $1 360 per month, and interest rate driven re nancing will never occur. The total nominal payment received by lenders is identical for all borrowers $1, since the coupon rate is zero, but the longer the horizon, the longer the average time to each p a yment, the lower the present v alue of the payments, and so the higher the points that must be paid to make the total value of points + payments equal to par. Hence A2 will always hold at a zero coupon rate, regardless of interest rate or transaction cost level.
For higher coupon rates and high enough transaction costs, assumption A2 may fail to hold if the term structure is downward sloping. For example, suppose transaction costs are in nite. Then neither borrower will ever re nance for interest rate reasons, so we can regard both loans as nonprepayable. Because the term structure is downward sloping, long term interest rates are lower than short term rates. Borrower l on average makes payments for longer than borrower h, s o f o r a n o p o i n t loan, borrower h ought t o p a y a higher coupon rate than borrower l. Hence, at a given coupon rate between these two v alues, V L h V L l , contradicting A2.
Proposition 4 In the presence o f b oth asymmetric information and re nancing costs, it is possible to construct a stable mortgage schedule which separates borrowers h and l, as long as Assumption A2 is satis ed.
We shall prove this by constructing the equilibrium. Figure 3 shows the zero pro t lines for the two borrower types. The zero pro t line for borrower l lies to the right of that of borrower h, b y assumption A2. The dashed line is borrower l's indi erence curve through the rst-best contract, i.e. the set of p; c pairs that satisfy the equation V B l c; r; t =Fc; t + p = V B l c ; r ; t =Fc ; t + p : 12
The intersection of this indi erence curve and borrower h's zero-pro t line is guaranteed by Lemma 2 and the fact that eventually, a s w e m o v e far enough to the left, both zero pro t lines will meet on the zero point axis. 15 The point at which the two lines cross is the loan selected by borrower h, which satis es both the lender's zero pro t condition and the borrower's incentive compatibility condition. 16 Extending this construction to more than two classes of borrower is straightforward, as long as a condition analogous to A2 holds for each successive pair of borrowers. For example, Figure 4 shows the construction for three borrowers, h high mobility short horizon, m medium mobility horizon, and l low mobility long horizon. The construction for borrowers m and l is exactly as above. The loan for borrower h lies at the intersection of the lender's zero pro t line for borrower h and the indi erence curve of borrower m that passes through borrower m's equilibrium contract.
2 Numerical Implementation
Interest Rates
To implement the model we need to make assumptions about movements in interest rates. We assume interest rate movements are described by the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1985 one-factor model. 17 In this model, the instantaneous risk-free interest rate r t satis es the stochastic di erential equation dr t = , r t dt + p r t dz t : 13 15 For a high enough coupon rate, it is optimal for both borrowers to re nance immediately see, for example, Dunn and Spatt 1986, property 2 , resulting in an immediate return of principal to the lender. To make zero pro t, the lender must therefore charge zero points to either borrower. 16 It is possible as in Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 that this schedule might not in fact represent a n equilibrium, if a single contract that is preferred by both borrower types can be introduced. We can rule out such contracts, however, using Riley's 1979 de nition of a reactive equilibrium.
17 This is one of the most commonly used interest rate models. It has been applied to the valuation of mortgages by, among others, McConnell 1981a,b and Stanton 1995. This equation says that, on average, the interest rate r converges toward the value . The parameter governs the rate of this convergence. The volatility o f i n terest rates is p r t .
One further parameter, q, which measures the market price of interest rate risk, is needed to price interest-rate dependent assets. The parameter values used in this paper are those estimated by P earson and Sun 1989: = 0:29368; = 0:07935; = 0:11425; q = ,0:12165:
The long-run mean interest rate is 7.9. Ignoring volatility, the time required for the interest rate to drift half way from its current level to the long-run mean is ln1=2=, 2:4 y ears.
Given this model for movements in r t , w e can now calculate the value of the mortgage using the fact that V r t ; t , the value of any i n terest rate contingent claim paying coupons or dividends at rate Cr t ; t , satis es the partial di erential equation 1 2 2 rV rr + , + qr V r + V t , rV +C = 0 : 14 Solving this equation, subject to a payout rate Cr t ; t and boundary conditions appropriate to the asset being valued, 18 yields the asset value V r t ; t .
Valuation and Optimal Prepayment Strategy
Natural boundaries for the interest rate, r, are 0 and 1. Rather 19 We solve Equation 14 numerically on a rectangular grid of interest rate and time values. The ner the grid, the better will be our approximation to the solution of Equation 14. However, the processing time is proportional to each grid dimension. For a given grid size in the y direction, the denser the implied r values are in the range corresponding to observed interest rates say 4 to 20, the better will be our approximation. We can a ect this density b y our choice of the constant . The larger the value of , the more points on a given y grid correspond to values of r less than 20. Conversely, the smaller the value of , the more points on a given y grid correspond to values of r greater than 4. As a compromise between these two objectives, = 1 2 : 5 w as used. 
Determining the Contract Rate and Points on a Newly Issued Loan
Equations 22 and 23 involve the coupon rate and points and value on a newly issued loan, c and p . These are determined endogenously as part of the valuation procedure. For each i n terest rate, we start with the least mobile borrower, and determine the newly issued contract for each borrower in turn, in increasing order of mobility. For the least mobile borrower borrower l, we know the points, p max , s o w e just need to nd the coupon rate. To do this, we calculate the lender's value, V L c; r; t , for every possible coupon rate. 22 The coupon rate on a newly issued loan, c , is the coupon rate at which V L + p max equals par. 23 This gives us both c r; t and V B c ; r ; t . 24 For the next least mobile borrower borrower h, we need to calculate both the coupon rate and the points on a newly issued loan. The new loan o ered to borrower h lies at the intersection of the lender's zero pro t line for loans issued to borrower h and borrower l's indi erence curve through the contract we just found. 25 Starting at the smallest coupon rate and working upwards, for each rate calculate the number of points required to ensure that the loan lies on borrower l's indi erence curve, p = V B c + p max , V B c:
25
The coupon rate on a newly issued loan is determined by the value of c at which V L + p rst drops below par, 26 where the number of points, p, is given by Equation 25. For subsequent borrowers, we repeat this process, using borrowers m and l, then h and m, etc.
This algorithm is based on one proposed by Dunn and Spatt 1986 , which also values loans taking into account the possibility o f m ultiple rounds of re nancing. However, the situation here is substantially more complex. First, whereas Dunn and Spatt value only a single loan, assuming zero points, we v alue multiple loans, determining both the coupon rate and points for each. Second, Dunn and Spatt do not include exogenous re nancing in their model determined by here. This means that they can be sure that, whenever a borrower re nances, he or she is re nancing into a loan with a strictly lower coupon rate than the current loan. Hence, they can value the lowest coupon loan rst which will never be re nanced, then the next lowest which might be re nanced, but only into the lowest coupon loan, and so on, valuing the loans one at a time in increasing order of coupon rate. We cannot do this here. Because borrowers may m o v e when interest rates are high, they may re nance into a loan with a coupon rate higher than that of the current loan. We can thus no longer value the loans one at a time, as in Dunn and Spatt 1986 . The values and optimal prepayment policies for loans with all coupon rates, as well as the optimal set of contracts for lenders to o er for every possible interest rate, all need to be determined simultaneously.
Numerical Results
The algorithm described above w as used to value 30-year xed-rate mortgages, assuming various initial yield curves, chosen by three classes of borrower with speed-of-moving parameters l = :05, m = :067, and h = :1. 27 The transaction cost payable on re nancing, X, i s 5 of remaining principal, and is the same for all borrower classes. The maximum number of points, p max , is set to 0.1 10 points. Figure 5 depicts three possible yield curves: upward sloping, at and downward sloping. Figure 6 shows the results for the upward sloping yield curve. As before, the solid lines are the lender's zero pro t lines and the dashed lines are borrower indi erence curves. The solid line furthest to the right is the zero pro t curve for a lender issuing a thirty-year mortgage to the longest horizon borrower l = :05. As above, the longest horizon borrower chooses a loan with the lowest possible coupon rate and highest possible points. 10 points corresponds to a coupon rate of 6.9 for this borrower. The medium and short horizon borrowers select progressively higher coupon and lower point combinations, all three contracts yielding zero pro t to the lender. The spread between the coupon rates on the loan taken by the longest borrower and that of the shortest borrower is approximately 200 basis points, and there is a corresponding di erence of 11 points. Figure 7 shows corresponding results for the at yield curve depicted in Figure 5 . The general pattern is similar, but the di erences between the contracts are less marked than for the upward sloping yield curve. The di erence between the coupon rates of the loans selected by the shortest and longest horizon borrowers is again roughly 200 basis points, but there is only a 9 point di erence. The zero pro t lines are closer together because the option value for the longer class of borrower falls due to the lower likelihood of non-interest rate driven re nancing, and the lower forward rates at long maturities. These di erences reveal very important information about the characteristics of the borrowers taking out the loans. Ignoring this may lead to signi cant errors in predicting prepayment, and hence to errors in valuing and hedging mortgages. 28 Figure 8 shows the results for the downward sloping yield curve depicted in Figure 5 . Here again the general pattern is similar, but the di erences between the contracts are even less marked than for the at yield curve. The di erence between the coupon rates of the loans selected by the shortest and longest horizon borrowers is again about 200 basis points, but there is now only a 7.7 point di erence. Table 2 presents simulation results for four possible yield-curve e n vironments, ranging 27 In other words, the expected time until the three borrowers next move i s 1 = = 2 0 y ears, 15 years and 10 years respectively. 28 This was rst pointed out by Dunn and Spatt 1988. from upward sloping to steeply downward sloping corresponding to short rates of 4.5, 8, 11.5 and 15. The table compares the equilibrium points coupon choices of high and low mobility borrowers for various restrictions on the number of points paid, transaction cost levels, X, and mobility parameters, h and l . Each equilibrium points coupon combination generates zero pro t to the lender. In the base case, the high mobility borrower has an expected horizon of 15 years h = :067, and the low mobility borrower has an expected horizon of 20 years l = :05. The maximum points level in the market is set to 10 of the initial balance, and transaction costs are assumed to be 5 of the remaining balance. These parameter values are the same as those used in Figures 6 8, and the numerical results are similar. The coupon rates paid by both borrowers are monotonically increasing in the riskless interest rate, as is the number of points paid by the high mobility borrower, which ranges from 1 at a short rate of 4.5 upward sloping to 6 at a short rate of 15 downward sloping.
The second and third sets of simulations in Table 2 consider the impact of changing the maximum number of points paid by the low mobility borrower. In the second set of simulations, no maximum is imposed p max = 1. The low mobility borrower therefore chooses a loan with a zero coupon rate, to avoid interest rate driven re nancing completely. All other assumptions about transaction costs and mobility are the same as in the base case. The high mobility borrower pays slightly more points than in the base case, but much lower than those paid by the low mobility borrower ranging from 1.65 to 14.9 points. Thus relaxing the assumption of a maximum level of points paid by the low mobility borrower still leads to a separating equilibrium with realistic combinations of points and coupon selected by l o w er mobility borrowers. In the third set of simulations, the maximum level of points is set to 5 of the initial balance. Both borrowers now p a y a somewhat higher coupon rate and lower points than in the base case.
The transaction costs are increased to 10 and 20 of the remaining balance, respectively, in the next two sets of simulations. The cap on points is returned to the base case level of 10. The results indicate that the points coupon trade-o is relatively insensitive to transaction cost increases in all four yield-curve scenarios. As the cost of re nancing increases, the coupon rate paid by the long horizon borrower decreases slightly keeping points constant, due to the reduced value of the prepayment option. For the high mobility borrower, on the other hand, the coupon rate increases at low i n terest rates, but decreases at higher interest rates. The points paid by the high mobility borrower do the opposite, decreasing at low i n terest rates, and increasing at higher interest rates. Note that in the upward sloping yield curve e n vironment with a 4.5 short rate, high mobility borrowers actually require negative points in equilibrium. However, points paid plus transaction costs always exceeds zero. Borrowers never get cash back". 29 The last three sets of simulations demonstrate the e ect of di erences in the relative mobility of the low and high mobility borrowers when all other base case assumptions hold. When the horizon of the high mobility borrowers is decreased from 15 to 10 years h = :1, the high mobility borrower consistently chooses lower levels of equilibrium points and a higher coupon rate than in the base case. When the high mobility borrower's horizon is further reduced to 5 years h = :2, we see even lower points, and even higher coupon rates. When the long horizon borrower's decreases to 10 years l = 0 : 1, keeping the short horizon borrower's horizon at 5 years last set of simulations, the long horizon borrower's coupon rate goes down compared with the previous set of results, due to the reduced value of the prepayment option. At the same time, the high mobility borrower's points increase slightly, and the coupon rate decreases.
From these results it is clear that the mobility of each class of borrower, the shape of the yield curve, and to a lesser extent the level of transaction costs are all important i n determining the optimal menu of contracts o ered by lenders. Our model allows lenders, for the rst time, to quantify the impact of all of these factors in a realistic interest rate environment.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
One of the most striking features of the U.S. mortgage market is the wide choice of xed rate mortgages FRMs, di ering in their points coupon tradeo , available to potential borrowers. Dunn and Spatt 1988 suggested informally that the existence of such menus of FRMs could serve as a self-selection device see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 , allowing the lender to learn private information about potential borrowers' mobility. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence that, for a given coupon rate, mortgages with low points tend to be prepaid more rapidly than mortgages with high points. However, previous attempts to model this formally, while at the same time allowing interest rate driven re nancing see, for example, LeRoy 1996 and Yang 1992 , have been unable to construct an equilibrium in which m ultiple classes of borrower select di erent xed rate loans. We show that this is not a result of the speci c implementation of these previous models, but follows, rather, from the optimal prepayment assumption, combined with the fact that, in these models, all payments made by borrowers are received by lenders. Retaining the optimal re nancing assumption, but introducing transaction costs payable by borrowers, and not received by lenders such as appraisal fees, credit reports etc., we show that it now becomes possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which di erent borrowers select xed rate loans with di erent combinations of coupon rate and points. There is thus a crucial distinction between points which are a transfer from borrowers to lenders and true transaction costs which are paid to a third party.
We contribute to the broader literature on mortgage valuation and prepayment see, for example, Stanton 1995 , by n umerically implementing our model. We develop the rst contingent claims mortgage valuation algorithm that can quantify the e ect of self-selection on real contracts in a realistic interest rate setting. Our algorithm allows investors to account for self-selection when valuing mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Moreover, it is an equilibrium model, unlike the reduced form models used on Wall Street. It therefore, for the rst time, allows lenders to determine the optimal points coupon schedule to o er a speci ed set of potential borrowers, given the current level of interest rates. Our numerical simulations show that the mobility of each class of borrower, the shape of the yield curve, and to a lesser extent the level of transaction costs are all important in determining the optimal menu of contracts o ered by lenders.
Finally, while our model clearly shows that o ering a menu of contracts with di ering point coupon combinations can provide a mechanism for lenders to learn private information about borrower mobility, this is not achieved costlessly. All but the longest horizon borrowers re nance more often than they would in the absence of asymmetric information, incurring the deadweight costs associated with such re nancing. If all borrowers knew exactly when they would move, lenders could persuade them to self-select costlessly by o ering a menu of contracts with maturities equal to their horizons, rather than di erent points. Even with uncertainty about the actual time of moving as in our model, the likelihood of a long horizon borrower having to re nance a short horizon loan is still higher than the likelihood of a short horizon borrower re nancing the same loan, making such a loan relatively less attractive t o the long horizon borrower. The recent proliferation of loans with many di erent horizons 30 may t h us represent an attempt by lenders to persuade borrowers to self-select with lower deadweight costs. 31 30 For example, it is now possible to take out a xed rate loan, amortized using a 30 year schedule, but with a balloon payment due in 3, 5, 7 or 10 years, rather than the traditional 30 years.
31 Consistent with this story is the fact that in Canada, where mortgages typically have prepayment penalties unlike U.S. mortgages, banks tend to o er menus of loans distinguished primarily by term, rather than points. The existence of prepayment penalties makes re nancing more expensive in Canada, thus increasing the incentive for lenders to separate borrowers by an alternative mechanism to the points coupon tradeo .
A Proofs Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two borrowers h and l, with h l . T o prove the rst part of the proposition, note that the low mobility borrower, l, can exactly imitate the high mobility borrower by 1. Randomly re nancing with a hazard rate h , l in addition to the exogenous hazard rate l .
2. When choosing whether to re nance, following exactly the optimal strategy of borrower h.
This results in cash ows that are indistinguishable from the optimal policy of borrower h, and hence a value of V B h c; r; t . This is one feasible policy for borrower l, so the optimal policy for borrower l must result in a value at least this low, hence V B l c; r; t V B h c; r; t : 26
For clarity, w e shall prove the strict inequality assuming that exogenous prepayment occurs only at discrete times, rather than continuously. 32 For example, assume that exogenous prepayment can occur on one occasion per month, with probability equal to the total probability of exogenous prepayment a t a n y time during a month given a hazard rate , Since the right hand side of this equation is increasing in c, b y Lemma 2, the lower the coupon rate and hence the higher the points the better o is the borrower. In any suggested equilibrium in which the lender o ers the borrower a loan with points below p max such a s contract Z 0 in Figure 1 , another lender could o er another loan such as contract Z in Figure 1 with higher points that would be preferred by the borrower, and would make the lender a positive pro t.
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume such a pooling equilibrium does exist, with contract Z p the contract chosen by borrowers h and l, as shown in gure 2. Lenders are making a pro t on type h borrowers, and an o setting loss on type l borrowers. However, now consider contract Z . This contract is preferred to Z p by t ype h borrowers, but is less attractive than Z p to type l borrowers. 33 As a result, if a new lender were to enter the market o ering this loan, only type h borrowers would take it, the lender would make positive pro ts on the loan, and the old lenders would make a loss on the old loan. This argument extends to multiple borrower types. 33 The divergence of the indi erence curves follows from assumption A1. Separating loan schedules for di erent initial conditions. In the base case, the mobility parameters for the two borrowers are 0.05 and 0.067 corresponding to an expected horizon of 20 and 15 years respectively, the transaction cost payable on re nancing is 5 of the remaining principal, and there is a cap of 10 on the maximum number of points payable. For every other set of results, one parameter is varied relative to the base case, keeping the other two the same. Solid lines show contracts yielding zero pro t to the lender when taken out by borrower h high mobility short horizon and borrower l low mobility long horizon respectively. Dashed line is borrower l's indi erence curve. The high mobility borrower borrower h selects loan that lies on intersection of lender's zero-pro t line and borrower l's indi erence curve through borrower l's rst-best contract. Solid lines shows contracts yielding zero pro t to the lender when taken out by borrowers h high mobility short horizon, m medium mobility horizon, and l low mobility long horizon respectively. Dashed lines are borrower indi erence curves. The medium mobility borrower borrower m selects loan that lies on intersection of lender's zero-pro t line and borrower l's indi erence curve through borrower l's rst best contract. The high mobility borrower borrower h selects loan that lies on intersection of lender's zero-pro t line and borrower m's indi erence curve through borrower m's equilibrium contract. Separating loan schedule for three classes of borrower, with moving governed by hazard rates 0.05, 0.067, and 0.1 corresponding to an expected horizon of 20, 15 and 10 years respectively. For all three borrowers, the transaction cost payable on re nancing is 5 of the remaining principal on the loan.
